ABSTRACT. As the United States northern neighbor, Canada serves as a NATO ally and a strategic partner with Washington through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canadian forces have fought honorably and bravely in concert with American forces in many wars. Canada's Government, however, has been less consistent in promoting a credible vision of Canadian national security policy and geopolitical interests in its defense white papers. These documents have often contained idealistic rhetoric about adhering to a rules-based international order and defending freedom. In reality, Canadian governments of varying political parties have consistently failed to provide the sustained funding and coherent national security strategy to make Ottawa an effective partner with the U.S. and the NATO alliance in addressing historical and emerging national security threats. This article examines Canadian defense white papers for several decades and recommends ways Canada can ensure its defense policy planning can have greater credibility in the national security policymaking corridors of its allies and with potential adversaries.
Introduction
Throughout its history, Canada has struggled to develop consistent defense rhetoric and policy to match its lofty rhetoric about promoting international peace and security while being a valued member of the world's free nations. While Canadian military personnel have frequently fought and died for freedom, their government 8 has been inconsistent in ensuring Canada has the military force structure and political and fiscal support necessary to remain a militarily credible member of the world's free nations and a valued ally of the U.S. This has been reflected in oscillating Canadian political attitudes and levels of public participation in the defense policymaking process from willingness to cooperate with the U.S. in continental and global security matters to a sanctimonious and utopian rhetorical idealism seeking to delusionally distance Canadians from hard power realities of human nature and international politics and security. This national security freeriding has occurred due to Ottawa's geographic proximity to the U.S. and close integration with U.S. military policymaking structures such as North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). 1 Frustration over Canada's uncertain attitudes toward defense policy and spending was reflected in a February 3, 1947 We have been placed in a ludicrous position. From the point of view of effectiveness we were the fourth striking power in the war, and we were in it from the time it began. We were welcomed on the battlefields, but we are excluded from the peace talks. Our soldiers were asked to fight, occupy a place in decisive battles and help to win wars. When it comes to peace making we are gracefully accorded only the privilege of submitting our views. Either we are a part of this world organization or we are not, and until all the mysticism is cleared away about what we are -a little, middle, or great power, a power on our own, a power working in cooperation in cooperation with other British countries, a North American power in association with the United States -until our government makes up its mind on some such questions as these, who can say whether our defence money is wasted or not? 7 This report also stressed the Canadian defense arrangements do not envision independent military action by Canadian forces and that such forces are designed to operate collaboratively with NATO, NORAD, and United Nations peacekeeping activities. This document went on to stress that unification of Canadian military forces may be required maintaining:
Although no western country has yet achieved unification of its Armed Forces, doubts have been raised in all countries in all countries in recent years about the traditional Service basis of organization. Combined operations are becoming the rule rather than the exception, with each mission requiring the participation and close cooperation of all three Services. Operationally, the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) bear a much more distant relationship to the Air Division in Europe or the air defence forces under NORAD than to the anti-submarine forces of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN); both elements operate, in the North Atlantic, under the command of SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic). 8 The Commission cautioned that effective force consolidation could not be based on joint control of the three military services if the government desired to maintain traditional responsibility of individual service Chiefs of Staff for armed forces control and administration. This document went on to recommend the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff receive "control and administration" of elements common to two or more services as designated by the Defense Minister and that the new title of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff become "Chief of Canadian Defence Staffs." Recommendations from the Glassco Commission played a key role in the Pearson Government's March 1964 defense white paper whose principal author was Defense Minister Paul Hellyer (LIB-Trinity, ON). This document opened by stressing that Canadian defense policy objectives included preserving peace by supporting measures for deterring military aggression; supporting Canadian foreign policy including Ottawa's participation in international organizations; and providing for protecting and surveilling national territory, airspace, and coastal waters. It went on to stress the emergence of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery systems as posing new problems for North American defense; emphasized the need for Canada to establish a Joint Staff and develop means for joint planning and intelligence; naively believed that China would not acquire an effective nuclear arsenal; and realistically recognized that many Communist leaders consider détente as a tactical measure and a means to buy time. 10 It went on to stress that Canadian defense is part of the larger strategic issue of North American defense, emphasized what Ottawa saw as the critical importance of participating in United Nations peace-keeping, and sought to move its military toward a more unified organizational structure without providing cost estimates on how much funding or personnel capabilities would be required to meet these objectives. The emphasis on force unification for perceived cost-benefit and organizational safety purposes is detailed in the following assertion:
Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the government has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step toward a single unified defence force for Canada. The integrated control of all aspects of planning and operations should not only produce a more effective and coordinated defence posture for Canada, but should also result in considerable savings. Thus, integration will result in a substantial reduction of manpower strengths in headquarters, training and related establishments, along with other operating and maintenance costs. The total savings to be effected as a result of such reductions will make available funds for capital equipment purchases, and eventually make possible more equitable distribution of the defence dollar between equipment and housekeeping costs. Sufficient savings should accrue from unification and permit a goal of 25% of the budget to be devoted to capital equipment being realized in the years ahead.
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On July [6] [7] 1964 Canada's House of Commons debated bill C-90 containing much of the content of the Defense White Paper including proposals on military force unification. Criticism of this legislation was expressed by former Defence Minister and MP Douglas Harkness (1903 Harkness ( -1999 ) (PC-Calgary North) who noted Parliament had received no evidence that the new system would not be more confusing or cumbersome than the status quo and that there would be four or five chains of command from the top down to individual units. He went on to stress how important it was for the Defence Minister to receive separate independent military advice instead of being exclusively dependent on one source of military advice. 12 Hellyer stressed that this legislation would implement Section 5 of the White Paper calling for implementing and expanding the capabilities of Canadian Forces out to 1974, stressed that the Air Force had more than enough pilots to execute its missions, and that the government had fulfilled its responsibilities in providing for national defense requirements. Bill C-90 was approved by voice vote on July 7, 1964. 13 
Canadian Forces Unification (Pearson)
The Pearson Government went ahead with its plans to unify Canadian military forces in 1967. This produced contentious and controversial debate which continues affecting Canadian defense policymaking five decades later. Debate on Bill C-243 The Canadian Forces Reorganization Act consumed much of April 1967 . MP Josh McIntosh (1909 -1988 (PC-Swift Current-Maple Creek, SK) criticized the proposed unification on April 4, 1967 contending that it made sense only if Canada opted out of its other defense commitments, that there was no way of knowing how it would impact Canada's security and unification's impact on Canadian allies, and that the Defence Minister was destroying combat troops and making them useless for existing military commitments if unification occurred. He also proclaimed:
Unification will not save the taxpayers money. It will not improve the effectiveness of our armed forces. Unification will disrupt and destroy the alliances to which we are now committed. It will destroy our national sovereignty and destroy our national pride. It will get us into many situations that will be dangerous for us. 14 On April 11, 1967 Hellyer defended forces unification and government defense planning maintaining that they would provide a CAN $1.5 billion five year equip-12 ment program for the Canadian forces including armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles; the capacity for peacekeeping operations; anti-tank missiles and guns; helicopter-equipped destroyers to increase naval anti-submarine capacity; purchasing additional operation support ships; and mobile force fighter bombers. He went on to contend that such equipment would give Canadian forces the ability to carry out tasks mandated in the 1964 Defence White Paper.
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Bill C-243 was ultimately approved in a 127-73 general party line vote on April 25, 1967 . It went into affect on February 1, 1968 when the RCN, RCAF, and Canadian Army were eliminated and unified into the Canadian Armed Forces which became known as the Canadian Forces. This ostensible unification did not eliminate armed service branch loyalties with a 2009 analysis of this legislation saying it created a bias against national security planning from a national perspective and tied to annual federal budget dynamics.
2009 analysis of this legislation stressed that Hellyer rejected Pearson's advice to retain important elements of service traditions and many distinctions between air, land, and sea components. Hellyer dismissed this recommendation and believed that all Canadian military personnel should wear the same green uniform, have the same rank structure and promotion ladder, have the opportunity to be employed across all three services, and identify themselves primarily with the Canadian Forces and consequently change their value and loyalties. This did not occur and service-centered loyalty remains entrenched in Canadian military culture though this culture must evolve to meet emerging national security challenges instead of blaming flawed historical policy decisions. The next Canadian Defence White Paper Defence in the 70s was issued in February 1971 by Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1919 Trudeau ( -2000 (LIB-Mount Royal, QC) and Defence Minister Donald MacDonald (LIB-Rosedale, ON). This document reflected the Trudeau Government's desire to maintain some distance between Canada and the U.S. on military issues, Trudeau's desire to develop a distinctively "Canadian identity" on the international stage, aspirations for upgrading Canadian rhetoric about the importance of international peacekeeping and protecting national sovereignty, while attempting and achieving limited success in efforts to develop and fund a coherent national defense policy.
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Rationales for developing this document included desiring to focus on the strategic nuclear balance between the U.S. and Soviet Union, Richard Nixon's upcoming visit to China, and the desire to promote Canadian interests in the Arctic including emphasizing promoting "social justice" and ensuring a harmonious national environment. This document preposterously claimed that bomber defenses made military bombers relatively less important, that peacekeeping remained a core component of Canadian foreign and defense policy resulting in preventing or spreading hostilities, and believed that Canadians should not worry about nuclear 13 fallout resulting from U.S. anti-ballistic missiles intercepting Soviet missiles flying over Canada, and contended that an agreement limiting deployment of ABM systems would be beneficial to Canadian security interests. 18 One clear point in this document is the key role geography plays in Canadian security as reflected in the following statement:
Canada is a three-ocean maritime nation with one of the longest coastlines in the world, and a large portion of the trade vital to our economic strength goes by sea. The Government is concerned that Canada's many and varied interests in the waters close to our shores, on the seabed extending from our coasts, and on the high seas beyond, be protected.
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This document went on to describe how Canada has passed legislation extending its territorial sea from three to twelve miles; that fishing zones encompassing 80 
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Challenge and Commitment also stressed the importance of protecting Canada's Arctic sovereignty, urged creation of a nuclear submarine program to assist in this effort, stressed the age of Canada's military equipment including the Navy relying exclusively on ships in commission or under construction in 1971, ship, the Air Force using 75% of the aircraft it had in 1971, regular maritime forces of 10,000, land forces of 22,500, and air forces of 23,050. It acknowledged Canada's inability to carry out Arctic Sovereignty operations by air and sea while also expressing concern that Ottawa might have to surrender space-based surveillance operations to the U.S. The Mulroney Government proposed increasing defense spending by 2% annually after inflation for the next fifteen years, recognized that increase beyond that might be necessary, and that there would be sufficient flexibility in this spending to account for changing financial, military, strategic, and technological developments.
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Initial public response to this document was positive as reflected in newspaper articles and broadcast commentaries. Between 1984 and 1990 The initial early post-Cold War defense white paper released by Canada was also produced by Mulroney's Government and Defence Minister Marcel Masse (1936-2014 ) (PC-Frontenac, QC). 27 Canadian Defence Policy noted the seismic geopolitical and strategic changes wrought by the Soviet Union's collapse. Where Europe was concerned this document noted the following paradoxical reality:
Nationalism is in the ascendant. It can be a powerful constructive force. Yet, as ancient nations reappear, ethnic hatreds also rekindle the violent confrontations of earlier eras. Ironically, even as nationalism reshapes the borders of Central and Eastern Europe, the nations of the continents western half are foregoing sovereign prerogatives in the interest of greater economic efficiency and political stability. At their historic December 1991 meeting in Maastricht, European Community leaders agreed to a further monetary integration and increased cooperation in security and defence matters. 28 This document also noted the increasing role of religion as a source of tension and division in various global areas and that globalization can have positive and negative effects in global regions. It also stressed that Canada continues to see NATO as a force for European stability and Canada's willingness to make its forces available to NATO if crisis or war occurs and remain closely engaged in European security. It also stressed the only the U.S. has the military capabilities necessary to defend North America's geographic expanses and that Canada would maintain its existing security relationship with the U.S.
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Changing international strategic environments and domestic political and economic contingencies, however, would require Canada to end its military bases in Europe and reduce the size of its armed forces from 84,000 regulars in September 1991 to 76,000 by 1995-1996 while defense spending would decline to $CAN 10.580 billion ($14.394 billion) by 1994. This document also announced plans to cancel construction of a facility in Kuujuag, QC, close a military station in Bermuda in 1994, and consolidate regional supply and publications depots to locations in Edmonton and Montreal. 30 This document also stressed that Canada must maintain its ability to defend against air attacks and would do so by enhancing aerial surveillance and reconnaissance capability by enhancing CF-18 fighter squadron capability at Cold Lake, AB, and Bagotville, QC while providing additional air squadrons at Comox, BC, and Shearwater, NS for combat support, electronic warfare training, and coastal patrol while also assisting maritime and land forces. It also emphasized Ottawa's strong belief in maintaining and strengthening international arms control regimes such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and Missile Technology Control Regime.
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This white paper was criticized in various Canadian newspapers as being a "muddle of wishful thinking and idle negligence," the State Department expressing disappointment over planned troop withdrawals; that it is bad policy for the Finance Minister instead of the Defence Minister to set defense policy; and Navy Captain Robert Thomas said the white paper was more inward looking than Canadian foreign policy and criticizing the document's naval policy contending:
The attempt to respond to a full range of maritime tasks inherent in the announced defence policy is neither economically or militarily sound…. With a skimpy fleet divided between two coasts (and unable to guard the third), the resulting capacity will be insufficient to fully satisfy national requirements or to make a significant difference to an alliance…. The Canadian Navy of the future cannot satisfy national security requirements if it tries to be all things to all people.
Thomas went on to argue that the planned acquisition of six new conventional submarines and six new corvettes should be cancelled and that 18 new frigates should be purchased to build what he saw as a stronger more flexible Navy. The 1994 White Paper on Defence was the premier defense policy document of Chretien's premiership and produced by Defence Minister David Collenette (LIBDon Valley East, ON). Its rhetoric reflected the idea of a "peace dividend" due to the Soviet Union's collapse apparently obviating the need for significant Canadian military forces. This mindset and concern in Chretien's government over reducing a $CAN 40 billion budget deficit saw defense spending decrease 30% in real terms between 1993-1994 and 1998-1999 ; military personnel reduced from 75,000 to 50,000 and the delay and cancellation of new equipment. 35 Broad topical white paper contents included proclaiming the Cold War's conclusion, the rise of ethnic, religious, and political extremism and the spread of advanced weapons technologies as major security problems, the need for combat capable forces within budgetary constraints, protecting Canada by being able to monitor and control activity within national territory, airspace, and maritime jurisdictional areas, maintaining defense cooperation with the U.S., and contributing to international security by participating in multinational peacekeeping operations, strengthening the United Nations, and participating and reforming NATO. 36 Specific combat operational capabilities promised by this document included:
• A naval task force with up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates, or submarines) and a support ship with appropriate maritime air support; • Three separate battle groups or a brigade group consisting of three infantry battalions, an armored regime and artillery regiment with appropriate combat and combat service support; • A wing of fighter aircraft with appropriate support and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft; • Earmarking an infantry battalion group as a UN standby force or serving with NATO's intermediate reaction force; and • Terminating Canada's commitment to maintain a battalion group for defending northern Norway. 37 Further provisions of this document included cutting acquisitions by at least $CAN 15 billion over the next 15 years, reducing the DND civilian workforce to approximately 20,000 by 1999, placing acute emphasis on social engineering in Canadian forces employment by providing "equitable employment opportunities" for personnel regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, or culture, and reducing anti-submarine warfare activities, focusing on protecting shipping and countering missile-carrying submarines in the North Atlantic and increasing participation in UN and multilateral operations. 38 This document reflects a reassertion of idealism and utopianism in Canadian national security policymaking. It may have been realistic in terms of Canada's budgetary environment and extant public opinion and in reflecting increasing Canadian interest in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific. However, it did not accommodate for Canadian participation in the Kosovo War and intrastate conflicts in countries as varied as East Timor, Haiti, Rwanda, and Somalia resulting in increasing operational tempo and stress on Canadian Forces, the rise of Islamist terrorism, the emerging threat of ballistic missiles and the refusal to develop indigenous ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems or participate in the U.S. BMD system, and displeasure by Canadian military officers that their concerns about operational capability erosions were not listened to by policymakers unwilling to cope with the reality that international military commitments require high-quality personnel, equipment, and significant financial resources to sustain and have domestic and international credibility. 42 Martin's government released a national security policy statement in 2004 and a defense document to an international policy statement in 2005. His government would be one that lived on borrowed time due to increasing public dissatisfaction with a long period of Liberal Government demonstrated by the Quebec sponsorship scandal which saw government publicity contracts to promote Canadian federalism in Quebec go to advertising firms connected with the Liberal Party. The evolution of this scandal diminished public confidence and trust in the Liberals, produced a highly critical governmental commission report, and ultimately resulted in the Liberals being toppled from power in January 2006 by the reformed Conservative Party of Canada (CPC). 44 This document claimed Canada's three core national security interests were: 1. Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad; 2. Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and 3. Contributing to international security.
Additional policy measures described in this document included establishing an Integrated Threat Assessment Center to ensure all threat-related information is compiled, assessed, and reaches policymakers needing it in a timely and effective manner; establishing a National Security Advisory Council consisting of nongovernmental experts; developing an advisory Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security consisting of members of Canadian ethno-cultural and religious communities, and making the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness the entity responsible for testing and auditing federal agency departments critical security responsibilities.
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Developing threat assessment capabilities, establishing a National Security Advisory Council, and giving Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada key security testing and auditing powers are sound measures. However, establishing a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security is pandering to separatism and group identity politics when national security policymaking should be focused on national cohesion and a coordinated national governmental response to security crises and the military strategic and operational realities influencing these crises and the ability of governments to respond to them. 46 Functional areas of Canadian policymaking targeted in this document included intelligence, emergency planning and management, public health, transport security, border security, and international security. Specific performance measures targeted for enhancement within these component entities included increasing spending to enhance Canadian intelligence collection capability emphasizing security intelligence; increasing federal cooperation with provincial, territorial, and municipal emergency operations centers; replenishing and updating the National Emergency Services Stockpile System; clarifying responsibilities and strengthening marine security sectoral coordination; deploying facial recognition biometric technology on Canadian passports consistent with international standards; and ensuring Canadian Forces are flexible, responsive, and combat-capable for wide operational ranges including allied interoperability.
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The National Security Strategy was projected to cost over $CAN 500 million and balance national security with personal freedoms with maritime security being a major recipient of this funding. The conservative National Post, however, referenced the recent Al Qaida attack on Madrid's train station by stressing that
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Canadians do not believe they are locked in the 21 st century's long war against Islamist terrorism, warning that then current generations of Canadians had not experienced security environments like their ancestors did in two world wars and the Cold War, contending that the Martin Government's policy was short on details and shorter on money, and warning that it may take the occurrence of terrorist events within Canada for Canadians to become more security conscious. Criticism of this nonchalant attitude toward national security was expressed in a letter to the Ottawa Citizen warning the Canada was good at wasting money on questionable heritage projects, government advertising, a gun registry, and bilingualism when giving the military the resources needed to protect the public from terrorism would be a better use of taxpayer dollars. The following year the Martin government Foreign Ministry released a five volume series of international policy statements with one of the volumes covering defense policy. These document compilations were issued by Defence Minister Graham and Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew (LIB-Papineau, QC) and also covered foreign affairs, international trade and international development. 49 Themes addressed in the defense volume of these reports included the international security environment in the early 21 st century, a new vision for Canadian Forces, protecting Canada and Canadians, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in a changing world, contributing to a safer world, and future tasks for Canadian forces. This document proclaimed that the Canadian forces personnel would be increased by 5,000 regular and 3,000 reserves which would enable Canada to participate in international operations anywhere, that land forces would receive the vast majority of this increase effectively doubling their capacity to undertake overseas operations, and that Canada would gain the ability to continuously sustain up to 5,000 personnel on international operations while also better responding to natural disasters and terrorist attacks. 50 This document also noted the increasing operational tempo of Canadian Forces since 1990 saying that in May 2004 Canada ranked second among NATO countries in the percentage of personnel deployed on multinational operations and sixth in terms of total numbers. It also stressed how the complex and chaotic contemporary operational environment (three-block war) meant that land and naval forces could carry out integrated operations in one city block, stabilization operations in another block, and humanitarian operations in an adjacent block while also enforcing maritime exclusion zones, air forces flying in supplies and humanitarian aid while also needing to engage opponents. Such developments would require Canadian forces to better integrate maritime, land, air, and special operations forces; adapt their capabilities and force structures to deal with threats arising from instability in failed states; and requiring forces to become more responsive by enhancing their ability to respond quickly to domestic Canadian or international crises by arriving on the scene faster, making rapid transitions to operations upon arrival, moving more expeditiously within theater, and sustaining deployments for extended periods.
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This document dubiously claimed that Canada no longer faced the threat of Russian bombers in Canadian airspace when this would become a recurring problem over the following decade. It correctly stated at terrorist groups could use hijacked airliners, crop dusters, drones, and cruise missiles to attack Canadian targets and that the government must improve its gathering, tracking, analysis, and use of threat information. 52 One conservative journalistic analysis of this document described it as "drunk on bureaucratic babble" and "these pages deliver nothing except pious declarations of intent." A Liberal Party Senator stressed that Canada needed to spend money on its military stressing that Army commanders had to scramble to find parts, equipment, and personnel from one another to mobilize; that the Navy had serious problems with every class of fleet ships being designed to fight yesterday's wars; that the Air Force had insufficient capacity to move troops effectively and quickly to combat zones and humanitarian relief sites; that Canada's military needed to increase its size from 62,000 to 90,000 to carry out the demanding tasks assigned to it by the government; and that while Canadians are spending about $CAN 373 per capita on defense, Australians and British per capita defense spending are $CAN 688 and $CAN 988 per capita respectively. • Strengthening the overall state of Forces readiness to deploy and their ability to sustain operations once deployed; and • Improving and modernizing defence infrastructure.
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This policy was praised and criticized by varying sectors of Canadian politics and the defense community. Laurie Hawn (CPC-Edmonton East, AB) told the House of Commons on May 14, 2008 that the government supported the Canadian forces, would provide them the necessary equipment, and provide Canada's defense industry with the jobs and tools to achieve these objectives. 59 Criticism of the white paper and its funding was expressed on May 16 by MP Marlene Jennings (LIB-Notre Dame-de-Grâce-Lachine, QC) who criticized the government for not allowing the defense plan to be read and demanded the government provide more specifics including how much the strategy would cost Canadians.
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A 2010 article in the Canadian Military Journal maintained Canada First was a good first step for restoring Canada's international reputation and that $CAN 30 billion in annual defense spending is a small insurance premium for protecting Canadian interests and the Canadian economy. 61 A 2009 article in Survival criticized Harper's Government for acknowledging that its northern military moves are 23 responding to increased Russian assertiveness, that Harper is recreating "myths of the Cold War," and that identifying Russia as a potential threat is contrary to the Northern Dimension of Canada's foreign policy declaring that Canada is positioned to develop an Arctic strategic partnership with Russia. An analysis that same year by the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute praised this document for summarizing governmental defense perspectives and plans and approved of its proposed small but steady defense funding increases. However, it also faulted Canada First for having an excessively general strategic framework and failing to prioritize its initiatives.
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A 2009 consultant's report prepared for DND revealed various findings about support for Canada's military, awareness of defense spending, and different regional breakdowns in support for Canadian defense efforts. Report findings revealed that 82% of respondents support the Canadian Forces with over 54% strongly supporting Canadian Forces. Overall support for these forces has historically tended to be lower in Quebec though there was an increase in support for these forces in this province from 62-73% between March and December 2009. Public support for significant government defense spending is fairly high at 75% but in Quebec this falls to 51% with Alberta ranking highest in support with 91% of this province's respondents favoring significant defense spending.
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Additional report findings showed 61% of Canadians were relatively optimistic that the government could meet Canada First funding objectives with 71% of those in Atlantic Canada being most optimistic and 56% of British Columbians being least optimistic; awareness of plans to increase new military equipment saw 66% aware of the intent of purchasing land combat vehicles, 63% military aircraft; and 45% ships; only 36% of Canadians believed the Forces had the equipment to do their job, only 26% believe that DND gets good value when making major equipment purchases, and 71% believed that defense infrastructure spending benefits local economies. 
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Compilation of this document involved a public consultation process including crowdsourcing from various individuals and organizations. Nearly 20,200 online submissions to the Defence Policy Review were made through an online consultation portal and over 4,700 participants contributed comments or votes using this forum. Eight cross-country roundtable meetings were held with two in Ottawa and the others in Edmonton, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, and Yellowknife. House and Senate Defence Committees also contributed to the process as did indigenous Canadians. An online public consultation report based on this feedback was released on October 24, 2016. 69 University of Calgary Political Science Professor Rob Huebert stressed the Arctic's renewed geopolitical importance stressing increasing American and Russian aircraft and submarine capabilities in this region. Maintaining that this requires Canada to rethink its previous emphasis on Arctic cooperation, he urged Canada and NORAD to improve an aerial surveillance system which had not been updated since 1985 and to make a decision on replacing the aging fleet of CF-18 jet fighters. He also stressed that Canada needs to rethink former Prime Minister Harper's decision that there is no place for NATO in the Arctic by contending that Canada should accept Finland and Sweden into NATO membership in order to strengthen Arctic defense against a resurgent Russia which has been making increasing aerial incursions into those countries. 70 David Bercuson, a University of Calgary historian colleague of Huebert's stressed the perennial problem of Ottawa's unwillingness to meet the NATO standard of spending at least 2% of its GDP on defense. He also maintained that Canada must decide which global parts are most important to Canada's interests; which defense 25 spectrum arenas Canada should try to cover; and the extent to Canada engage militarily in areas where it has limited national interests. 71 Dr. Karen Breeck, the former President of Medical Women of Canada who as served as a Canadian Forces flight surgeon, complained that the Canadian military's force structure was: still largely based on the stereotypical soldier of Canada's past: male, white, European background, able-bodied, heterosexual, married with a stay-at-home wife, born in Canada, English or French mother tongue, Christian religious background, and with a core notion that war and soldiers = masculinity, as reinforced by Hollywood and popular media. If diversity truly is our strength as a nation and people are our most important asset, then defence priorities, policies, and practices must support and enable the "other" as a full and valued CAF team member.
She went on to maintain that the Canadian military should provide nationalized funding to ensure address gender integration problems including research, military equipment modification, life support equipment, pregnancy related needs, and formalize, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned from such integration.
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Jennifer Allen Simons of the Vancouver-based Simons Foundation stressed pleasure that Canada was taking up its former position at the United Nations (UN), seeking a UN Security Council seat, maintained that conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, and maintained diplomatic engagement should be more important than military conflict. She went on to assert that "currently no threats to Canada require a military response;" that threats to Canada are natural disasters and terrorist threats; that Canada should not participate in ballistic missile defense since the threat of missile attack has grown more slowly than anticipated; that China is threatened by U.S. sea-based anti-missile defenses; that Canada should rejuvenate nuclear disarmament; and that Ottawa should not invest in fighter aircraft since it is not under threat from such weaponry. 73 Strong Secure and Engaged also includes the fingerprints of Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland (LIB-University Rosedale, ON) whose foreword to this document proclaims that defense policy will make it possible for Canada to implement a "progressive, feminist foreign" policy to achieve shared objectives. An earlier journalistic essay by Friedland saw her describe Russian President Vladimir Putin as "cuddly, cooing," expressed hope that he might only serve two terms as President, and would eventually consider a second career as an environmental activist. 74 This white paper claimed it was the most rigorously costed Canadian defense policy ever, that it would meet Canada's domestic and international defense needs, and that governmental defense spending would increase from $CAN 18.9 million in 2016-2017 to $CAN 32.7 million in 2026-2027. It stressed it would provide various kinds of support for Canadian military personnel and their families while also promoting an agenda of social engineering by increasing the number of women in Canada's military from 15% of personnel in 2017 to 25% of personnel in 2016. 75 Force structure enhancements promised by this document including acquiring 15 surface combatant ships for the RCN and recapitalizing the Canadian Army's land combat capabilities and aging vehicle fleets along with modernizing command and control systems in order to expand its light force capabilities to be more agile and effective in complex operational theaters including peace operations. Strong Secure Engaged committed to acquiring 88 advanced fighter aircraft for the RCAF for enforcing Canadian aerial sovereignty, meet its NORAD and NATO commitments, and recapitalize aircraft such as the CP-140 Aurora anti-submarine warfare and surveillance aircraft. Additionally, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command is to be given the means to expand its operational capacity and invest in capabilities enabling rapidly deployable and agile forces to carry out domestic and international missions.
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Force projection enhancements also aspired to in Strong Secure Engaged include increasing the size of regular Canadian armed forces by 3,500 to 71,500 enhancing Arctic coverage with drone aircraft and enhanced satellite capability, enhancing cyber capabilities by hardening defenses and conducting active cyber operations against potential enemies in government authorized military missions, and developing capabilities such as supporting two sustained deployments of 500-1,500 personnel, a one time-limited deployment of 500-1,500 personnel for 6-9 months duration, and expanding abilities to provide civil assistance to authorities in terrorist or disaster situations.
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A good example of how this is more a social policy document than a national security policy document is reflected in the number of times selected individual words appear within its contents: Strong Secure Engaged is an egregious example of using a defense white paper as a document for promoting victim oriented group identity political objectives such as diversity and gender theory instead of containing sound military policy and threat analysis. The purpose of defense white papers is providing credible strategies and the sustained financial resources necessary to meet national security objectives through diplomatic, economic, military, and political means such as combat readiness and collaboration with allied countries. Strong Secure Engaged received favorable support from the Liberal Party when it was unveiled in Parliament, but scorching criticism from the CPC opposition. Defence Minister Sajjan said on May 29, 2017 that Canada had tripled its trainers and doubled its intelligence on Iraq and that funding in the defense policy review would give Canadian forces the predictable and sustainable funding escalator they need to carry out their operations. On June 13, 2017, Jean Rioux (LIB-St. Jean, QC) contended that Conservative mismanagement of renewing Canada's jet fighter fleet had forced the Liberal Government to explore purchasing 18 new fighters until a replacement for the CF-18 could be found and that a modern air fleet was vital for Canada to defend its airspace and sovereignty.
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Five days earlier, Shadow Defence Minister James Bezan (CPC-Selkirk, Interlake, Eastman, MB) proclaimed:
Yesterday, the Minister of National Defence presented Canadians with a book of empty promises. In two years the Liberals have failed to deliver a single piece of military equipment, and they do not plan on buying anything for our troops until after the next election. The Prime Minister already believes that our troops are appropriately provisioned. The Minister of National Defence cannot explain where the money is going to come from. When the Minister of Finance was asked about this yesterday, he said, "Go ask the defence minister. Where is the money going to come from? 80 Bezan resumed his attack on Sajjan and what he saw as shortcomings in defense planning and funding with this June 20 riposte:
Mr. Speaker, we are not questioning the minister's record. We are questioning his trustworthiness. Case in point, the sole-sourcing for 18 Super Hornets where the capability gap is imaginary. We already know that 88% of defence experts and 13 former Royal Canadian Air Force commanders have said there is no capability gap.
We have already seen $12 billion worth of cuts in two budgets under this minister. The government has done a defence policy review, but there is no money to actually resource it. If there is no money to resource it, then it is a book of empty promises.
The minister has been out there doing his tour. Canadians and members of the Canadian Armed Forces are hoping it is his farewell tour, because this is a minister who has gone out, and tried to sell something when we know the money is not in the budget. The Minister of Finance has said that currently the Canadian Armed Forces are properly provisioned. I can tell the House the money is not there to do the things the government says it is going to do.
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Analysis -A 2017 report by Canada's Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) wearily proclaimed that repeated Canadian governments came to power proclaiming that "Canada is back" and that defense policy reviews have been sporadic occurrences. It went on to argue that the Trudeau Government may not have had real interest in a serious and extensive review of national defense policy, and that governmental defense policy should focus on just defending Canada but being victorious in defending Canada. CDA went on to argue the "government must overcome its debilitating timidity about defence matters" and that effective defense never has been, never is, and never will be cheap. It also criticized Canada for following the opposite of Theodore Roosevelt's aphorism of "speak softly and carry a big stick" and that over the past five decades Canada has relied heavily on U.S. taxpayers to defend it.
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The Macdonald-Laurier Institute also excoriated this white paper. While acknowledging it made important contributions to improving the military's ability to manage threats and advance Canada's overseas interests, it asserted it did not provide an adequate conceptual foundation for DND to plan for the future. It faulted Strong Secure Engaged for vaguely speaking of Canada's declining to identify specific threats facing Canada and its allies, and not linking threats facing Canadian interests to actual responses. Such failure in providing proper planning guidance hinders the military's ability to adapt to emerging contingencies in an accelerating technologically developing security environment revolutionizing the conduct of war. Macdonald-Laurier said that without prioritizing Canadian Forces must prepare for all scenarios scattering finite resources over a wide area leaving significant capabilities gaps. 83 Canadians have conflicting and often ambiguous attitudes on military policy matters according to recent polling by Angus Reid and Forum Research Inc. A June 15, 2017 poll on important issues facing Canadians found terrorism and security was ranked as the most important by 13% of respondents behind the economy, the deficit/government spending, health care, and jobs/unemployment. An October 24, 2014 poll showed that 55% of Canadians said they were not confident in the ability of security services to prevent domestic terrorist acts, 50% of Canadians consider terrorism and ISIS top security threats ahead of Russian aggression and climate change. A September 25, 2014 poll showed 2/3 of Canadians supported some kind of involvement in U.S.-led action against ISIS, 38% supporting Canada sending military advisors to assist the U.S., 28% favoring using Canadian troops; 23% opposing Canadian involvement, 11% not sure; and 73% thinking U.S. efforts against ISIS will achieve some success against ISIS. A May 26, 2014 poll found that 44% of Canadians have a great deal of trust in Canada's military making it the country's most trusted institution; an April 16, 2015 poll showed 48% of Canadians approving and 40% disapproving of a Canadian Forces mission to Ukraine with this support being most popular among males, middle income individuals, individual in the prairie provinces and Alberta, Conservatives, and Anglophones and least popular in Quebec, among Liberals, New Democrats, and Francophones. Finally, an October 17, 2017 poll noted fears of nuclear war among Canadians are rising with 55% of respondents describing this as a very serious or fairly serious problem for Canada and 29% of Canadians saying they should join the U.S. ballistic missile defense system with 44% of Canadians should not join this system.
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Conclusion
The insularity many Canadians may have felt toward global security topics was brutally shattered with the October 22, 2014 87 Unfortunately, commitment to essential defense spending and serious military strategic planning and sustainment have been an afterthought for decades in Canadian defense white papers and political debate. A key problem underlying this lack of sustained Canadian commitment to military policymaking is that social programs take preeminence in Canadian political priorities and government spending. Recent articles maintain that the influence of Canada's 1966 Medical Care Act gives Canada a social welfare commitment resulting in political leaders giving preferential treatment to "butter" over "guns," regardless of their partisan perspective, consequentially leaving augmenting social spending as a focal prerequisite for enhancing the political survival of Canadian leaders. 88 This schizophrenia between short-term rhetoric on fulfilling national security requirements and domestic social spending and prioritizing perceived social policy requirements has been reflected in the text of the Canadian defense white papers analyzed here and in other Canadian defense policy statements and debate. Another recent example of this schizophrenia appears in a June 2017 parliamentary committee report on the importance of naval forces to Canadian security. This document's conclusion featured many sensible recommendations such as ensuring that the RCN is a key pillar of national security and sovereignty; that the fleet's size and budget be increased to meet domestic and international obligations; that a National Shipbuilding Strategy be supported; that the submarine fleet be replaced and upgraded to have under-ice capabilities, that drone technology be integrated into the fleet for Arctic and maritime domain awareness; and that there be increased focus and doctrine to advance Canada's Arctic naval capability and presence. Unfortunately, this same document also let itself fall into the abyss of group identity politics when said the RCN "must ensure that its personnel better reflect Canadian society…." 89 The quality of Canadian defense policymaking is also constrained by weak parliamentary oversight. Parliamentary defense committees do not have access to classified information. Such access could be statutorily granted by Parliament but this has not occurred. Consequently, this enables the government to keep such information from these committees limiting their ability to engage in intense oversight of defense matters. It also results in opposition parliamentarians preferring to engage in public criticism instead of secret monitoring of DND and the armed forces. Effective parliamentary oversight of defense is essential if Canada hopes to upgrade the quality of its military power and defense activities. Ottawa's defense policymaking commitments are also weakened by an internationalist orientation and reputational concerns combining to create a cycle of engagement and re-engagement where extrication from military commitments comes with high reputational costs. A result of this is Canadian participation in multilateral operations is being seen as a good ally but ceding control over the strategic duration of these commitments to forces beyond national control or not participating in such commitments and risking international standing. 90 Demonstration of the relatively short-term nature of Canadian international military operational commitments is reflected in the following two tables: Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in 1937 asked if it was possible for Canada to maintain friendly relations with the U.S. and ignore its defenses. An internal government memorandum published soon after contended that if Canada placing its defense in American hands "would virtually make us a Protectorate of the United States -subjecting all our external policy and some of our internal policy to the supervision of Washington.
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In a world characterized by increasing Russian aggression in the Arctic, Middle East, and Eastern Europe; Chinese aggression in the East and South China Seas; an increasingly bellicose North Korea developing a nuclear arsenal capable of reaching North America; various forms of Islamist terrorism; and assorted methods of cyber warfare, spaced-based power projection, and weapons of mass destruction; Canada can no longer cling to the belief that its good intentions immunize it from hostile global forces. Canadians must learn to accept hard power realities of international affairs, the innate and unrelenting aggression of human nature and international power politics, and the threats of external aggression and potential subversion to its security and vital interests. This can be done by increasing and sustaining its defense spending to well over the NATO recommended 2% of GDP, increasing the size of its active duty armed forces to over 100,000, augmenting its air, land, and naval capabilities to achieve greater interoperability with NATO countries, developing forces capable of sustaining unilateral expeditionary operations, joining the U.S. ballistic missile defense system, exclusively focusing its military policymaking on defending its vital interests in North America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific in collaboration with NATO and Pacific Rim allies, and making its Defence Minister the most important cabinet position after the Prime Minister.
Canada must jettison its utopian belief in peacekeeping and social engineering as valid instruments of national security policymaking and make the requisite financial and human resource commitments necessary to national defense in its force structure and defense policymaking documents. This must be done, even at the expense of popular social programs and its perceived internationalist reputation,
